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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
SUMMARY 
UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD 
PROPERTY: GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS 
AND DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS IN 
CIVIL FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. James Daniel Good Property,t the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
an action for civil forfeiture under the Controlled Substances 
Act2 can still be untimely even if brought within the five year 
statute of limitations.8 The court set this new precedent by in-
terpreting the federal statutes governing forfeiture procedures· 
as imposing separate reporting and notification requirements 
upon various government agents and officials. II Under the court's 
interpretation, if the government fails to meet these additional 
and separate requirements, the action will be dismissed as un-
1. United States v. James Daniel Good Property, 971 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1992) (per 
Goodwin, J., with whom Aldisert, J., joined; Noonan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). 
2. 21 U.S.C. § 881{a){7) (1988) provides that all real property which is used or in-
tended to be used in any manner to commit, or to facilitate the commission of a drug 
related violation, is subject to forfeiture to the U.S. government and no property rights 
shall exist in the, property. 
3. Good, 971 F.2d at 1378. 
4. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-04 '(1988). 
5. Good, 971 F.2d at 1379-81. 
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timely, even if brought within five years of the und~rlying predi-
cate acts.8 
The court also held that due process requires notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before a person's home can be taken 
pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act.7 Since defendant 
Good did not receive notice or a pre-seizure hearing, the statute, 
as applied, was a violation of his due process rights.8 The court's 
decision is consistent with the analysis used in an earlier Second 
Circuit case9 and contradicts the conclusion reached by an ear-
lier Eleventh Circuit court.10 Both earlier cases deal with the 
seizure of a house. 
II. FACTS 
On January 31, 1985, Hawaii state police officers searched 
Good's house pursuant to a valid search warrant. ll The officers 
uncovered almost 90 pounds of marijuana, various drug para-
phernalia, and $3,187 in cash.l2 Good pled guilty to drug charges 
on July 3, 1985, surrendered the cash, and served one year in 
jai1.1s 
On August 8, 1989, over four years after the search of 
Good's home, the United States brought this action seeking to 
forfeit Good's home and property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 
881(a)(7).14 The warrant authorizing seizure of Good's home, is-
sued on August 21, 1989, was based upon the sworn affidavit of a 
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) special agent.16 The affidavit 
relied exclusively upon evidence obtained during the January 31, 
1985 search.18 Good neither received prior notice of the seizure, 
6. [d. at 1381. 
7. [d. The applicable statute is 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). 
8. Good, 971 F.2d at 1384. 
9. United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258 (2nd Cir. 1989). 
10. United States v. A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d 625 (11th Cir. 1986). 
11. United States v. James Daniel Good Property, 971 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
12. [d. 
13. [d. 
14. [d. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) is the provision of the Controlled Substances Act that 
authorizes the forfeiture of real property. 
15. Good, 971 F.2d at 1378. 
16. [d. 
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nor was he given an opportunity to be heard prior to the 
seizure.17 
Good filed a timely claim for the property and later filed a 
motion for summary judgment and requested rents on the prop-
erty.IS The government also filed a motion for summary judg-
ment, which the district'court granted.I9 Good then appealed the 
district court's decision.20 
III. BACKGROUND 
The United States brought this action pursuant to the Con-
trolled Substances Act which permits the forfeiture of real prop-
erty.21 The Act does not, however, establish procedures that gov-
ern civil forfeiture. Instead, the Act incorporates the procedures 
provided by the customs laws.22 
Section 1621 of the customs laws sets forth the statute of 
limitations and states that no action for forfeiture can be 
brought unless commenced within five years after the alleged of-
fense was discovered.23 
Sections 1602, 1603 and 1604 of the customs laws set forth 
the following reporting and notification obligations of the gov-
ernment: (1) Section 1602 requires any agent or officer author-
ized by law to make seizures to immediately report every seizure 
and every violation to the appropriate official;24 (2) Section 1603 
requires a customs officer to report seizures or violations of the 
customs laws when discovered to the United States attorney for 
the district in which the violation or seizure occurred;2& (3) Sec-
tion 1604 requires the Attorney General to immediately inquire 
17. Good, 971 F.2d at 1382. 
18. [d. at 1378. 
19. [d. 
20. Good, 971 F.2d at 1378. 
21. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). 
22. 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988). The statute provides that "[t]he provisions of the law 
relating to seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture. . . for violation of the customs laws 
... shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, 
under any of the provisions of this subchapter .... " 
23. 19 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988). 
24. 19 U.S.C. § 1602. 
25. 19 U.S.C. § 1603(b). 
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into the facts of cases reported by customs officers and to 
"forthwith" commence proceedings for forfeiture if he deter-
mines they are necessary.26 The Good court found no cases 
which interpret the five year statute of limitations set forth in 
section 1621 in light of the obligations set forth in sections 1602-
1604.27 
In addition, the Controlled Substances Act does not provide 
for notice or a hearing prior to a seizure of the owner's 
property.1I8 
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS INTERPRETATION 
1. The Majority Opinion 
Initially, the majority recognized that two issues of first im-
pression were pref!)ented: (1) the proper scope of the govern-
ment's obligations under sections 1602-1604 when there has not 
been a seizure prior to the commencement of the action; and (2) 
the relationship between these sections and section 1621's stat-
ute of limitations.1I9 
To determine if sections 1602-1604 apply only when there 
has been a seizure prior to the forfeiture action, the majority 
began its analysis by interpreting the statutory language of each 
section.80 The court noted that all three sections refer not only 
to seizures, but also to violations or cases reported.81 Section 
1602 provides that an agent must immediately report "every vio-
lation" of the laws. 811 Section 1603 provides that the officer owes 
a duty whenever a "violation" is discovered.88 Section 1604 pro-
vides that the Attorney General must inquire into the facts of 
26. 19 u.s.c. § 1604. 
27. United States v. James Daniel Good Property, 971 F.2d 1376, 1379-80 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
28. Id. at 1382. 21 U.S.C. § 881. 
29. United States v. James Daniel Good Property, 971 F.2d 1376, 1378-81 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
30.Id. 
31. Id. 
32. See 19 U.S.C. § 1602; Good, 971 F.2d at 1381. 
33; See 19 U.S.C. § 1603; Good, 971 F.2d at 138l. 
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"cases reported to him."34 The court concluded that this lan-
guage cannot be read to limit the application. of the sections only 
when a seizure has occurred prior to the commencement of a 
forfeiture action.311 The court therefore held that the sections ap-
ply to the government both when seizures have taken place and 
whenever violations are discovered, regardless of when the ac-
tion is commenced.36 Based on this holding, the court concluded 
that the sections applied to the case at hand.37 
The majority next examined the relationship between sec-
tions 1602-1604 and the section 1621 statute of limitations.3s 
The majority scrutinized the language of section 1621, focusing 
primarily on the fact that the section is phrased in the nega-
tive.39 In particular, the majority emphasized that the language 
of section 1621 provides that no suit can be brought "unless 
... commenced .within five years after the time when the al-
leged offense was discovered. "40 The majority interpreted this 
language to mean only that the government cannot bring an ac-' 
tion after a five year lapse, not that the government can bring a 
suit any time within five years of discovering the offense.41 The 
majority concluded that this interpretation is consistent with 
the statutory language and retains a reasonable meaning when 
sections 1602-1604 are viewed as imposing a separate reporting 
and .notification burden on the government.42 
The majority further noted that section 1621 and sections 
1602-1604 use different standards for determining when the obli-
gations are triggered.43 The mandates of section 1621 are trig-
gered when the government knew or should have known of the 
offense while sections 1602-1604 are triggered only by actual 
knowledge.44 This distinction, as well as the more narrow tailor-
ing of sections 1602-1604 which apply only to certain federal of-
34. See 19 U.S.C. § 1604; Good, 971 F.2d at 1380. 
35. Good, 971 F.2d at. 1381. 
36.Id. 
37.Id. 
38. Good, 971 F.2d at 1381-82. 
39.Id. 
40. 19 U.S.C. § 1621. 
41. Good, 971 F.2d at 1381 (citing United States v. 2 Burditt St., 924 F.2d 383, 385 
(1st Cir. 1991)). 
42. Id. at 1381-82. 
43. Id. at 1381. 
44.Id. 
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ficers,411 provided further support for the majority's conclusion 
that sections 1602-1604 impose a separate and independent obli-
gation of reporting and notification upon the government.46 
The majority then remanded the case to develop the factual 
record in order to determine exactly when the mandates of the 
sections were triggered in Good's case.47 
2. Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Noonan dissented only as to the part of the majority 
decision which interpreted the statute of limitations. Judge 
Noonan stated that the majority had converted a set of "house-
keeping" rules into a statutory protection for drug oft'enders.48 
He was convinced that the only restriction should be the five 
year statute of limitations, and that the majority had given a 
new construction to a statute that has been in eft'ect and applied 
for nearly 70 years.49 . 
B. DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS 
The court began its unanimous due process analysis by find-
ing that Good did not receive prior notice or an opportunity to 
be heard before his home was seized, and that the Controlled 
Substances Act does not provide for such a hearing. llo The court 
then distinguished the many Ninth Circuit cases cited by the 
government for the proposition that property may be seized 
without a prior hearing. lIl Finally, the court analyzed the United 
States Supreme Court's decisions in cases considering whether 
there has been a due process violation.1I2 
45. Good, 971 F.2d at 1382. The court held that because all FBI and DEA agents are 
authorized to seize property, they are subject to the mandates of §§ 1602-1604. 
46. Id. at 1381. 
47. Id. at 1384. 
48.Id. 
49.Id. 
50. Good, 971 F.2d at 1382. 
51. Id. at 1382-83. The court stated that all but one of these cases involve property 
that can be easily removed from the jurisdiction. The court further stated that the one 
case involving real property is an eighth amendment case and not a due process case. 
Therefore, none of the cases cited by the government disposed of the due process claim 
in Good. 
52. Id. at 1382-84. 
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The court first examined the rule set forth in Fuentes v. 
Shevin. G3 The court noted that Fuentes requires notice and an 
opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation of a property 
interest except in extraordinary situations. G4 The court found 
that an extraordinary situation exists when there is a need for 
"very prompt action."1I1I The court then stated that land cannot 
be easily moved, so there is no special need for prompt action, 
and the Fuentes exception does not apply when land is 
involved.1I6 
The court next looked at the factors to be balanced as set 
forth by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.1I7 The fac-
tors are: (1) the significance of the property interest; (2) the risk 
of erroneous deprivation under current procedures; (3) the value 
of additional procedures; and (4) the government's interest in a 
pre-notice seizure.1I8 After the court held that people have very 
strong interests in their homes, that the government's interest in 
a pre-notice seizure is minimal, and that the government's inter-
est can easily be protected by other means,1I9 the court con-
cluded that the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis favors a pre-
seizure hearing.6o 
The court did not, however, use the preceding analysis to 
find the statute invalid on its face. The court instead applied 
the Mathews factors to. the facts of this particular case. The 
court found that Good's interest in his home was substantial, 
that the house was not moveable, and that the government could 
protect itself by other means less restrictive than a seizure.61 
Given these findings, the court held that the statute, as applied, 
violated Good's due process rights.62 
Finally, without elaborating, the court held that the due 
53. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
54. Good, 971 F.2d at 1383 (citing Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 80-82). 
55. [d. 
56. [d. 
57. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
58. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
59. Restraining orders or a bond requirement are viable options. Good, 971 F.2d at 
1383-84. 
60. [d. at 1383. 
61. [d. at 1384. 
62. [d. 
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proce'ss violation did not render the forfeiture itself invalid, and 
Good was entitled only to rents accrued during the illegal 
seizure.63 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit held that the government has an obliga-
tion to meet the five year requirement of section 1621 and the 
notification and reporting requirements of sections 1602-1604 in 
order to maintain an action for civil forfeiture.6• Although the 
court's conclusion was novel, and the decision does appear to ex-
pand protection for drug offenders, the Ninth Circuit inter-
preted the statutory language so that no section of the statute is 
rendered meaningless. Other courts have simply ignored the ex-
istence of sections 1602-1604 and applied only the five year limit 
of section 1621. The Ninth Circuit's holding recognized that sec-
tions 1602-1604 . must have some meaning or they would not 
have been included in the statutory procedures governing civil 
forfeiture. The court's interpretation gives meaning to sections 
1602-1604 without rendering section 1621 meaningless. The in-
terpretation was thus the most logical interpretation possible 
without ignoring sections 1602-1604. 
The Ninth Circuit also held, in effect, that the Controlled 
Substances Act is unconstitutional when applied to forfeitures of 
real property because due process requires a pre-seizure oppor-
tunity to be heard before the government can take real prop-
erty.611 Rather than render the statute invalid on its face, the 
court chose to send the legislature a clear message: amend the 
statute to provide for a pre-seizure hearing. 
Kevin T. Hunsaker* 
63. [d, 
64. United States v. James Daniel Good Property, 971 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
65. [d. at 1383-84. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993. 
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